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Abstract
The principal justification for minimum wage legislation resides in improving the
economic condition of low-wage workers.  Most previous analyses of the
distributional effects of minimum wages have been confined to simulation
exercises employing rather restrictive assumptions that guarantee the conclusion
that an increase in the minimum wage reduces poverty.  In contrast, we adopt a
more flexible "reduced-form" approach that links increases in both federal and
state minima to contemporaneous changes in poverty rates.  For the period
1983-96, we find indication of a poverty-reducing effect of minimum wages
among older junior-high dropouts and among teenagers.
11 Introduction
Supporters of minimum wage laws generally argue that minimum wages
improve the economic lot of low-wage workers.  However, if increases in the
minimum wage lead to reduced employment among this group, the effects on
poverty and other aspects of the distribution are ambiguous.  Economists who
have examined these effects have primarily relied on simulation exercises that
hinge importantly on a number of simplified and even contentious assumptions,
such as those having to do with disemployment effects and family labor supply
responses.  We follow an alternative, reduced-form approach that in correlating
changes in federal and state minima with corresponding movements in (several
measures of) the family income distribution avoids these problems.
Our analysis uses state-level data for the years 1983 to 1996, for three
groups most likely to be affected by minimum wage mandates:  teenagers,
young adults, and junior high school dropouts.  We focus primarily on the
poverty rates of these groups, but also offer a parallel analysis of the
association between minimum wages and average earnings, and between
minimum wages and weeks worked.
2 Theoretical Considerations and Related Empirical Work
In the standard competitive textbook model, a ceteris paribus increase in
an effective minimum wage shrinks the employment of unskilled labor.1  This
disemployment effect implies that the impact of minimum wage increases on
the distribution of earnings for low-wage workers is uncertain.  Some workers
may gain and others lose, implying that the benefits of the minimum wage
increase are not distributed evenly across low-wage workers.  Moreover, it is
not clear that low-wage workers would gain in an expected earnings sense
because the impact on average earnings depends on the scale of the
displacement effect, as well as labor supply elasticities in the uncovered sector
(see Gramlich, 1976).  Only in the absence of disemployment effects are the
implications more transparent, since every low-wage worker should gain in this
case.
                                                          
1 There may also be wage and employment consequences for other factors of production
according to whether they are gross complements or substitutes for low-wage labor.
2It is the joint presence of losers and gainers from minimum wage
increases that contributes to a similar theoretical ambiguity regarding the
consequences of minimum wages for the family income distribution.
Moreover, in discussing family effects, there are a number of other
complications that do not arise when the focus is simply on earnings.  First,
changes in the minimum wage may affect the labor supply of other members of
the families of workers directly affected by the minimum wage.  Since such
effects involve both income and cross-substitution effects, these responses
become difficult to predict.  Second, the effects of minimum wage increases
will also depend heavily on the initial family income position of workers whose
earnings are increased by the change, since such workers are not necessarily
concentrated at the low-end of the family income distribution.   Third, there is
little guidance from theory to help us identify the position in the family income
distribution of those workers who might lose jobs when the minimum wage is
increased.  In particular, an important question in determining the distributional
effects is whether job losses are concentrated among families at either the low
or high end of the distribution.  And, finally, both losers and winners from the
minimum wage increase may change their living arrangements as a result of
their reduced, or increased, earnings.  Even if there were no disemployment
effects, these complications lead to ambiguous theoretical predictions for the
effects of minimum wage increases when attention shifts from earnings to the
family income distribution.
Given the lack of clear theoretical predictions as to the consequences of a
rise in the minimum wage for the distribution of family incomes, the extant
empirical work has attempted to provide answers by simulating the effect of
actual or hypothetical mandates on an existing distribution.  The outcome
measures used in these exercises have included poverty rates (or gaps), the
income-to-needs ratio, and quintile or decile shares.
The simulation exercises generally allow for both disemployment effects
and incomplete coverage.  Disemployment effects are calculated using a range
of elasticities suggested by estimates from time-series studies.  One problem
with this procedure is that these time-series studies typically report elasticities
that indicate how minimum wages affect the employment of all teenagers, or
young adults, and not just those workers with wages directly affected by the
minimum wage increase.  Applying these same elasticities directly to a group of
minimum wage workers thus inevitably understates the implied disemployment
effect from the time-series estimate.  Furthermore, the simulation studies by
Horrigan and Mincy (1993), Johnson and Browning (1983), and Mincy (1990)
appear to assume that the disemployment effect is a proportion of initial hours
3worked for each affected worker, so that all workers share in the
disemployment effect.2 Because the elasticities used in these studies never
exceed unity, this assumption ensures that every low-wage worker will gain
from the simulated minimum increase.3
Simulation studies must also make some assumption about minimum
wage effects on workers initially working below the current minimum.  Most
studies first assume that these workers would be raised to the new minimum
and then, for the partial coverage case, repeat the exercise assuming that they
are unaffected by the change (see Burkhauser and Finegan, 1989; Mincy, 1990;
Horrigan and Mincy, 1993).  The exception is Johnson and Browning (1983),
who increase the wages of workers currently below the minimum by the same
proportion as the increase in the minimum wage.  As for workers earning
between the old and new minima, the simulations assume that their wages are
increased to the new minimum.
Previous studies of the effects of minimum wages on poverty find that
minimum wages reduce poverty, with simulated effects that appear to be
somewhat strong.  Thus, Burkhauser and Finegan (1989), who do not allow for
disemployment effects, find that a 24 percent increase in the minimum wage in
1984 would reduce the share of covered low-wage workers in poverty by 21
percent (reducing poverty from 14 percent to 11 percent for these workers).
That said, they also report that less than 12 percent of the increase in incomes
stemming from the hike in the minimum wage would accrue to poor families,
while 39 percent would go to families with incomes at least three times the
poverty line.  Mincy (1990), who simulates the impact of a 27 percent increase
in the minimum wage applied to the 1987 income distribution, obtains what
appears to be a bigger poverty-reducing effect.  Specifically, he finds that the
number of poor families - among all families, not just those with a low-wage
worker - should fall by 6 percent in the partial coverage case and 9 percent in
                                                          
2 The proportion is a function of the size of each worker’s wage change resulting from the
minimum wage increase.
3 Johnson and Browning (1983) provide one set of results where the elasticity of demand is
set equal to one, Also, the poverty simulations in Mincy do allow some families who are
nonpoor before the minimum wage increase to fall below the poverty line because of a loss
of employment; at the same time, however, he also assumes that every ex ante poor family
will experience an income increase if one of its members is affected by the minimum wage
increase.
4the full coverage case.4 These magnitudes are, however, quite sensitive to the
choice for the elasticity of demand for adult minimum-wage workers.
Simulations that consider the impact of minimum wages on the
inequality of family incomes point to very modest effects.  In a study that is
notable for its attempt to accommodate accompanying changes in tax and
transfer payments, Johnson and Browning (1983) find that a hypothetical 22
percent increase in the minimum wage in 1976 would have had /essentially no
effect on the Gini coefficient for family incomes.  Similarly, while Horrigan
and Mincy’s (1992) simulations based on a $4.71 minimum wage in 1987 point
to a modest decline in earnings inequality, the percentage of family income
held by each quintile of families is virtually unaffected.
The consensus view of prior simulation studies would appear to be that
minimum wages reduce poverty, but primarily by increasing, however slightly,
incomes throughout the distribution.  The explanation for this result is that low-
wage workers are distributed rather evenly across the family income
distribution.  Nevertheless, there are several simplifying assumptions implicit in
these simulations that may be very important to their outcomes.  The findings
may be the product of the particular assumptions regarding the magnitude and
incidence of displacement effects.  There are also complications arising from
assumptions about the coverage of the minimum increase for workers initially
below the current minimum.  These studies also ignore issues raised by possible
changes in labor supply of other family members, and by possible changes in
the family unit.
The only direct empirical study of minimum wage effects on the poverty
rate is that contained in Card and Krueger’s Myth and Measurement: The New
Economics of the Minimum Wage (1995).  They estimate regressions in which
the change in a state’s poverty rate from 1989 to 1991 is regressed on the
fraction of the state’s labor force (in 1989) that should have been affected by the
federal minimum wage increases in 1990 and 1991, that is, the fraction in 1989
below the level of the 1991 minimum wage.  Their results vary across
specifications but always provide a negative coefficient estimate, suggesting
that when more workers are affected, poverty rates are more likely to fall.
                                                          
4 These are average effects from five simulations using published estimates of teenager and
adult disemployment effects.  On Burkhauser and Finegan’s definition, low-wage workers
represent approximately 15 percent of the labor force.  If a similar percentage of families
have low-wage workers, then Mincy’s findings suggest that more families will be removed
from poverty by a minimum wage increase than do Burkhauser and Finegan’s results.
5However, their results for the overall poverty rate are small and statistically
insignificant.  They also estimate separate regressions in which the poverty rate
for workers only is the dependent variable, and find somewhat stronger effects,
but this approach fails to capture the impact of any disemployment effects of
minimum wages.  Despite the weak nature of their statistical evidence, Card
and Krueger (1995, p. 307) conclude that their analysis "points to a modest
poverty-reducing effect of the minimum wage."
Unlike simulation treatments, our approach relaxes the need to build a
restrictive and perhaps unrealistic model in assessing minimum-wage effects on
poverty.  We instead correlate actual changes in poverty (and other distri-
butional measures) with actual changes in the minimum wage.  Taking a cue
from the literature on employment effects of minimum wages, we estimate our
models by focusing on particular groups of workers considered most likely to
be affected by minimum-wage laws.  Our approach differs from the regression
analysis of Card and Krueger (1995) in two main ways: first, we focus on the
effects among families with low-wage workers, rather than for all families
(where the effect, if any, is likely to be very small); and, second, we consider a
much longer time-frame than their two-year interval.
3 Empirical Models and Data
Studies that focus on the effects of minimum wages on the employment
of teenagers and young adults typically estimate equations of the form:
Et = â1f(Mt) + â2Xt +  åt ,
where E is the employment (or unemployment) rate of the affected group, f(Mt)
is some function of the prevailing minimum wage, and X is a vector of
variables intended to capture other influences on the demand for low-wage
workers (see the survey in Brown, Gilroy and Kohen, 1982).  Most of these
studies have employed monthly time-series data on the labor force activity of
teenagers and young adults, though a recent study by Neumark and Wascher
(1992) uses cross-section, time-series data comprising state-level observations
for the 1973-89 time period.  
As we are interested in the effects of minimum wages on the income
distribution, we could also estimate time-series models in which the dependent
variable is some characteristic of the income distribution for low-wage workers.
Data on the family income distribution are available only on an annual basis,
however, leaving a fairly small sample to use for such estimations.  Therefore
6we chose instead to create a panel of state-level observations for the 1983-1996
period.5 These panel data include measures of poverty and upper-income status
for particular groups of individuals in each state (plus the District of
Columbia).  The base sources for our measures are the March Current
Population Surveys (CPS) for 1984-1997, which contain information on
individual and family income from the previous calendar year.6 The CPS data
also contain the poverty line for each family, which we use in constructing our
key measure:  the percentage of individuals whose families have income below
the family’s poverty line.  Inevitably, there is some arbitrariness in the
definition of the official poverty lines, and so we also estimate models in which
the poverty rates are calculated using new poverty lines that are 1.25 times the
official poverty cutoffs.
We calculated poverty rates for three groups whose income position we
consider most likely to be affected by changes in the minimum wage.   The first
two groups are defined on the basis of age, with one group containing all
individuals between the ages of 16 and 19 ("teenagers"), and the second group
comprising individuals aged 20 to 24 ("young adults").  Haugen and Mellor
(1990) find that roughly 60 percent of minimum-wage workers fall in these two
categories.  We also identify a group of individuals we call "junior-high
dropouts" - those above the age of 24 but with nine or fewer years of completed
schooling - because these workers are also likely to be involved in low-wage
labor markets.7  Poverty rates were also calculated for the group of prime-age
individuals (those aged between 25 and 54 years).
For each of our three groups, we estimate several models in which the
group’s poverty rate is the dependent variable.  Denoting this poverty rate by
Pst for state s in year t, our models are of the form
Pst =  á s + ãt + âlog(Mst) + ëXst + åt ,
                                                          
5 See Neumark and Wascher (1992), who discuss other advantages of using state-level data
in analyzing the effects of minimum wages.
6 The CPS measure of income includes earnings, government transfers, pensions, and
interest and dividend income.
7 Addison and Blackburn (1993) find that, in 1992, 44 percent of teenagers, 19 percent of
young adults, and 24 percent of junior-high dropouts were paid at or below the minimum
wage (among those with jobs).  For all individuals, only 12 percent were paid at or below
the minimum.
7where á  and ã represent state-specific and year-specific intercepts.  These
equations are estimated as fixed-effects models.  The year effects should pick
up any nationwide recessionary effects on the distributional measure (their
inclusion also frees us from having to choose a price index to express the
minimum wage variable in constant dollars), while the state effects should
control for any tendency for some states to provide better labor-market
opportunities for low-wage workers than other states, as well as differences
between states in the generosity of AFDC benefits, UI replacement rates, etc.8
The vector X consists of characteristics of the dependent-variable group
(specifically, average age, percent white non-hispanic, and percent hispanic).
Given that there may be differential business cycle effects across states,
we also estimate specifications that include state- and year-specific independent
variables that measure state-specific cycle effects.  In these specifications, one
cyclical control that we use is the poverty rate of prime-age individuals.  Our
reasoning for this approach rests on the argument that the prime-age part of the
population is unlikely to be directly affected to any great degree by changes in
the minimum wage, so that the prime-age measure should largely reflect how
the state of the cycle in that state and that year affects the outcome indicator.
Additionally, we will also use the prime-age unemployment rate as an
alternative cyclical control.
If the only minimum wage law were federal legislation, our suggested
model could not be estimated, because the minimum wage variable would be a
linear function of the year dummies.  Minimum wages are not the same across
states, however, as some states set wage floors that are higher than the federal
standard.  It is this variation in the minimum wage variable that allows us to
identify a minimum-wage effect.  Specifically, the identification of the
minimum-wage effect is achieved through a combination of increases in the
minimum wage for higher-income states as their state minima are raised, and
increases for lower-income states as the federal minimum was subsequently
increased.  Following Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994), we enter the
"prevailing" minimum wage - the state or federal minimum, whichever is
higher - in logarithmic form, rather than use the coverage-adjusted relative
minimum wage variable (the "Kaitz index“) used in studies of minimum wage
                                                          
8 The state effects also control for any tendency for state price levels to differ on average
from the national price level.
8effects on employment.9 Because there were only three states with prevailing
minimum wages above the federal minimum wage in the 1978-1984 period, we
began our analysis of poverty rates in 1983.10
A final measurement issue has also to be addressed.  Minimum wages
often change within a calendar year, implying that our family income data
(from a given calendar year) may correspond to two different periods with
different minima.  For example, the federal minimum wage increases that
occurred in 1990 and 1991 went into effect on April 1 in each of those years, so
that the effective minimum wage in most states was different in the first three
months and the last nine months.  Our solution to this problem is to use a
weighted average of the minimum wages when the minimum changed within
the calendar year, with the weights set equal to the proportion of the year in
which the particular minimum was in effect.11 A list of the minimum wages in
states with an above-federal minimum is provided in Table 1.
The dependent variables are estimates of the true population quantities,
and the variability of these estimates is likely to be higher when the underlying
sample size is smaller.12 This naturally leads to heteroskedasticity in the error
terms in our regression, and so we use weighted least squares.  The traditional
solution is to assume that the error variance is inversely proportional to the
sample size, but this approach implicitly assumes that the model would have a
perfect fit if the population quantities were known.  Accordingly, we use
weights equal to the inverse of the predicted values from regressions of squared
                                                          
9 Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994) criticize the relative minimum wage variable because it
tends to be negatively correlated with the average wage of teenagers.  They find virtually
no evidence of disemployment effects when the logarithm of the minimum wage is used in
place of the relative minimum in the employment equations estimated by Neumark and
Wascher (1992).  The absolute minimum wage may also be more relevant than the relative
minimum wage when analyzing absolute measures of poverty.
10 There were some changes in prevailing minimum wages in the 1973-1977 period.
Unfortunately, all of the states cannot be separately identified in the March CPS public use
samples before 1977.
11 Information on the value of state minima and the date at which they changed was obtained
from the review of state labor law changes for the previous year provided in each year’s
January issue of the Monthly Labor Review.
12 In particular, our dependent variable is a weighted sample mean of the form p=Ówixi,
where xi is the individual poverty indicator and wi is the corresponding CPS weight for
that individual (normalized to sum to one).  This leads to a dependent variable with
unconditional variance (due to sampling variability) of ð(1-ð)Ówi2, where ð is the true
poverty rate.
9OLS residuals on a constant and the inverse of the weighted sample size for the
particular state/year observation (see Blackburn, 1997).13
4 Findings
4.1  Effects on Poverty
Averages of the state-level poverty rates over the 1983-96 period are
provided in the first row of Table 2.  Poverty rates among the groups most
likely to be affected by increases in the minimum wage are at least double those
of prime-age individuals.  A similar result holds when poverty rates are
calculated with poverty lines inflated by 25 percent.  We also calculated the
percentage of individuals in families above three times the poverty line, and
above five times the poverty line, and report these results in Table 2.  The
difference between prime-age individuals and teenagers or young adults (but
not junior high dropouts) in the upper-income percentages is somewhat smaller,
reflecting a relatively high degree of income inequality among our low-wage
groups.  Not surprisingly, average weekly earnings appear to be considerably
smaller for teenagers and junior high dropouts (but less so for young adults)
than for prime-age individuals.  Table 2 also reports the average cell size for
calculating the state/year statistics; these are all reasonably large, although
there is naturally a great deal of variation in these cell sizes.   Fortunately, the
smallest cell size for any of our state/year observations is 34, so that none of
our dependent variables are calculated using an extremely limited sample of
individuals.14
Fixed-effects estimates of the impact of the minimum wage on the
probability of being in poverty are reported in Table 3.15  In specification (1),
we include the logarithm of the minimum wage without a state-specific control
                                                          
13 The skedastic functions we estimate are of the form ó2 = a + bÓwi2.  In instances in which
the constant is not statistically significant (at the 5 percent level), we assume the variance
of the error term is proportional to the sum of squared weights.
14 We also estimated models in which the sample was restricted to state/year observations in
which at least 60 individuals were used in constructing the poverty rate used as the
dependent variable.  Results under this sample restriction were qualitatively similar to
those obtained using the complete sample of state/year observations.
15 We also calculated F-statistics for the presence of state and year effects.  We uniformly
rejected the null hypothesis that state effects are absent in Table 3.  The analogous test for
year effects often did not reject the null; however, we decided to include the year effects in
all regressions to obviate the need to choose a specific price deflator.
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for the business cycle.  For each group, we find a negative estimated coefficient
for the minimum wage variable, implying that higher minimum wages reduce
poverty.  This estimate is statistically significant (at conventional levels) for
both teenagers and junior-high dropouts.  The implied elasticity for both of
these  groups suggests that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage would
lower the dropout poverty rate by 5 percent (representing around a full
percentage point drop for both of these groups).  Among the group-specific
controls, the percent of the group that is white and non-hispanic always shows a
strong and statistically significant decreasing effect on poverty that is quite
consistent across groups.   The coefficient estimate for the average age for the
group is always negative, as expected, but is only statistically significant for
junior-high droputs (for whom there is much greater variation in this variable
than for teenagers and young adults).16
In specification (2) of Table 3, we include the prime-age poverty rate as
an additional independent variable.  The coefficient estimate for the prime-age
poverty rate is always positive and statistically significant.  Its inclusion
reduces slighty the elasticity of the poverty rate with respect to the minimum,
but the coefficient estimate remains statistically significant for junior-high
dropouts, and at least marginally significant for teenagers. Specification (3)
substitutes the level of the minimum wage in place of its logarithm, with little
effect on the statistical inference or implied elasticities. 17
One problem with using the prime-age poverty rate as a control,
however, is that it is not exogenously determined with respect to the poverty
rate of other groups.  Indeed, to the extent that many members of our affected
groups reside with prime-age individuals, the poverty rates of the two groups
are clearly simultaneously determined.  This problem is compounded by the
fact that we use estimates of poverty rates, with many of the same families
being used to form the poverty rates of the affected groups and the prime-age
                                                          
16 We also estimated specifications that included the percentage of the group that was female
as an independent variable.  This variable was statistically significant in many
specifications (with the expected positive sign), but had essentially no effect on the
estimated minimum wage effect coefficients.  Additionally, estimates using only the
female part of the junior-high dropout sample provided results that were similar to the
estimates using the complete junior-high dropout sample.
17 Because we are here using the level of the minimum wage rather than its logarithm, we
now index for inflation using the CPI-U price index.
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individuals.18 As an alternative control, therefore, we use the unemployment
rate for prime-age individuals in specification (4) of Table 3.  With this control,
estimated minimum wage effects are virtually identical to those obtained
without cyclical controls.  The final specification in Table 3 includes both the
prime-age poverty rate and the male unemployment, with minimum wage
results the same as in specification (2).
As a way of summarizing the estimated effects of minimum wages on poverty,
we performed a back-of-the-envelope calculation that combines the point
estimates (for specification 5 of Table 3) for all three of our low-wage groups.
The result suggests that a 25 percent increase in the minimum wage should
lower the 1996 poverty rate for these three groups combined by 9 percent (a
drop of 1.9 percentage points, from a poverty rate of 22.4% to one of 20.5%).
The 95 percent confidence interval ranges from a decline in the poverty rate by
14 percent to a decline of 3 percent.19 By comparison,  Burkhauser and Finegan
(1989) found that a similar increase in the minimum wage in 1984 would have
decreased poverty among "low-wage“ workers by 21 percent.  Although
comparisons are difficult because of differences in the definition of low-wage
workers, our results do seem to suggest a similar poverty-reducing impact to
that suggested by Burkhauser and Finegan.
We next explored the sensitivity of our results to the estimation
technique and the equation specification -- see Table 4.   First, we estimated our
equations by OLS rather than weighted least squares, using standard errors that
are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity.  This is an alternative manner of
handling the heteroskedasticity problem that naturally arises from the
difference in cell sizes across states and years.  Unfortunately, these results
                                                          
18 We also estimated equations in which the prime-age poverty rate is the dependent variable,
using the prime-age unemployment rate as a cyclical control.  The estimated coefficient
(standard error) for the log of the minimum wage was -.034 (.014), suggesting that
minimum wages do lower prime-age poverty.  Although statistically significant, this
coefficient estimate is considerably smaller in absolute value than those reported in Table
3 for either teenagers or dropouts.  The poverty-reducing effect for prime-age poverty
could largely result from the fact that many prime-age individuals are in families that also
include teenagers and junior-high dropouts.  Indeed, when we use the poverty rate for
prime-age individuals with more than 12 years of schooling and who live alone as the
dependent variable, we obtain a positive coefficient estimate (standard error) on the
minimum wage variable of .042 (.034).
19 The calculation of the confidence interval assumes that the coefficient estimates for the
three groups are uncorrelated, and that the prime-age poverty rate is unaffected by
minimum wage changes.
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(presented in the first column of results in the table) suggest that our findings
are somewhat sensitive to the estimation technique.  The absolute value of the
minimum wage coefficient estimate for teenagers increases, while the young
adult and dropout coefficient estimates decrease in absolute value.  The general
tenor of the results is similar -- a decreasing effect on poverty -- but the
particular group that is most affected does change with these results.  Given the
considerable variation in sample sizes (and therefore in error variances), we
prefer the GLS estimates of Table 3 as they should be efficient.  Nonetheless,
either manner of handling heteroskedasticity leads to the conclusion that there
is considerably stronger evidence of poverty-reducing effects for teenagers and
dropouts than for young adults.
A second sensitivity consideration stems from concerns about the
arbitrariness of the poverty-line threshold.  We used an alternative poverty rate
as the dependent variable, where this poverty measure is based on poverty lines
that are set 25 percent higher than the official lines.  These results are provided
in the second column of results in Table 4.  There is now considerably less
evidence of a poverty-reducing effect for teenagers (and the estimated effect for
young adults remains statistically insignificant), but the effect for dropouts
remains statistically significant and of a similar magnitude to that found using
the official poverty lines.   It would appear that any decrease in poverty arising
from minimum wage increases for teenagers is associated with movements of
initially poor individuals to income levels that are just above the official
poverty lines.
Neumark and Wascher (1992) found evidence of a lagged response of
employment to changes in the minimum wage.  We considered a similar lagged
response on poverty by estimating models that also included the minimum
wage lagged one year as an independent variable.  The results are presented in
the third column of Table 4.  The coefficient estimate for  the lagged minimum
wage is never individually statistically significant.   It is also the case that the
sum of the coefficients on the current and lagged minimum wage are always
negative.  However, this sum is only statistically significant for junior-high
dropouts (for whom the estimated total impact is exactly the same as in Table
3).  For teenagers, the sum is of a similar magnitude as without the lag, but the
statistical quality of the support is weakened.  There is considerably less
evidence of an effect for young adults in this specification.
In an earlier version of this paper, we found very little evidence of a
poverty-reducing effect for junior-high dropouts.  Two major differences
between our current specifications and those of the earlier version are that we
13
were considering a shorter time period, and that we failed to include important
group-specific characteristics.  To illustrate the importance of the choice of
sample period to the estimated minimum wage effects, the penultimate column
of Table 4 reports results when the sample is restricted to observations from the
1983-89 period.  Excluding information from the 1990s, we see very little
evidence of a minimum wage effect (the coefficient estimate for teenagers is
actually positive).  Admittedly, the standard errors are increased due to the
reduction in the sample size, but the failure to find a statistically significant
estimate in the limited time period is due to the change in the coefficient
estimates and not merely the result of an increase in their standard errors.   It
appears the case that the nature of the minimum wage effect on poverty
changed in an important manner between the 1980s and the 1990s.
The fixed-effects procedure assumes that the state effects are stable over
the sample period for which the equation is estimated.  If this restriction is
inappropriate, the changes in the minimum wage could be partly picking up
differential trends in the demand conditions for low-wage workers within
states.  This could be behind the different results found when the sample period
is restricted to 1983-89, as the state effects are more likely to be essentially
stable over a shorter period.  One way to relax the constraint of stable state
effects is to include additional controls that allow for separate trend effects for
each state.  Estimates with these additional controls are presented in the final
column of Table 4.  The support for a poverty-reducing effect of minimum
wages for teenagers is greatly weakened by these additional controls (compared
to the results in the final column of Table 3), but they have no effect on the
estimated coefficient for dropouts.20
In summary, there is considerable evidence of a poverty-reducing effect
of minimum wages for junior-high dropouts, with this evidence primarily
coming from reactions to minimum wages that were increased in the 1990s.
There is evidence of a poverty-reducing effect for teenagers, but this support is
much more sensitive to issues of specification.
4.2 Effects on Earnings and Employment
We also estimate equations in which the dependent variable is average earnings
of individuals in our low-wage groups.   Our intention is to explore the
                                                          
20 As a group, the state/trend interactions are never statistically significant at conventional
levels.
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connection between changes in the minimum wage and these average earnings
amounts.  The first two columns of Table 5 present results for specifications
(with cyclical and group-specific controls) in which we use either the log of
annual earnings or the log of weekly earnings as the dependent variable.  These
results suggest an increasing impact of higher minimum wages on both annual
earnings and weekly earnings for all three low-wage groups.  The impact
appears strongest for teenagers, while for young adults and junior-high
dropouts the estimated coefficients suggest elasticities from changes in the
minimum wage of 40 percent or less for both annual earnings and weekly
earnings.   Although the effect on average earnings appears strongest for
teenagers, Table 3 indicated stronger poverty-reducing effects of minimum
wages among junior-high dropouts.  This dissonance may partly be the result of
a more direct connection between earnings and family income for junior-high
dropouts than for teenagers.  Thus, for example, in 1996, the average earnings
of a junior-high dropout represented 22 percent of the associated average
family income.  The average teenager’s earnings at that time were 11 percent of
its family income.
Although not the primary focus of the paper, we also estimate equations
that allow us to explore the impact of minimum wages on the employment of
workers in our low-wage groups.  The March CPS contains information on
weeks worked over the calendar year, which we averaged across individuals in
each of our groups to provide a measure of average weeks worked over the year
in each state.  The logarithm of this variable was then used as the dependent
variable in equations that included the log of the minimum wage as an
independent variable.   We also included the log of average weeks worked for
prime-age individuals as a control, as well as the unemployment rate and the
log of average weekly earnings for prime-age individuals.  Given the definition
of the dependent variable, these equations are comparable to equations
elsewhere in the literature that estimate disemployment effects by regressing
the employment rate on a function of the minimum wage.  The primary
difference is that we are implicitly using the employment rate averaged over the
52 weeks of the year as the dependent variable, rather than the employment rate
in a given week.21
The fitted equations for the full sample period are presented in the third
column of results in Table 5, and the results are frankly unexpected.  Previous
                                                          
21 Another difference is that we estimate our regressions in logarithmic form, although
results of a similar nature are found if the level of weeks worked is used.
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work would suggest that we should expect a negative coefficient estimate for
the minimum wage variable, but in our results the point estimate is positive for
all three groups.  And although statistically insignificant for young adults, the
minimum wage coefficient estimate is statistically significant for junior-high
dropouts and (at least marginally) for teenagers.  The estimates can be
interpreted as elasticities, and suggest a particularly large positive elasticity of
40 percent for junior-high dropouts.
The minimum wage effect reported for teenagers is not typical of
research findings in this area (we are not aware of any parallel research results
for junior-high dropouts).  The usual result is that minimum wages tend to
lower teenage employment rates.  Thus, for example, in a similar analysis of
employment effects, Neumark and Wascher (1992) report an elasticity of
teenage employment with respect to the minimum wage of roughly -0.1.  One
obvious difference between our studies is the time period examined, Neumark
and Wascher’s sample period ending in 1989.  The difference in time periods
again seems to be a major factor in the difference in our results; if we confine
our sample period to 1983-1989, we also obtain a negative coefficient estimate
that indicates a small (but statistically insignificant) elasticity of -0.2 (see the
last column of Table 6).22 Results for dropouts also provide much less evidence
of an employment-increasing effect from raising minimum wages when
estimated using only the data from the 1980s.  In fact, our employment
estimates are more consistent with the line of research advocated by Card and
Krueger (1995), including the studies by Card (1992a), Card (1992b), Katz and
Krueger (1992), Card, Katz and Krueger (1994), and Card and Krueger (1994).
As noted earlier, the evidence of a poverty-reducing effect from raising
minimum wages largely comes from the experience in the 1990s.  This pattern
of results seems to coincide with a change in the employment impacts of
minimum wages that also appears to have occurred after 1990.  Given the lack
of evidence of an employment-reducing effect from higher minimums in this
period (and the possibility that employment might have even been increased), it
is not surprising that there is also evidence that poverty is reduced because of
these post-1990 increases.  It is also informative that our coefficient estimates
suggest a poverty-reducing effect of a similar magnitude to that suggested by
Burkhauser and Finegan (1989); they assumed no disemployment effects in
                                                          
22 There are several other differences in the two studies; for example, the specification of the
minimum wage variable differs (Neumark and Wascher use the Kaitz index), and we do
not control for school enrollment behavior.
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performing their simulations, and our evidence suggests that this may have not
been a misleading assumption.
5 Summary and Discussion
Studies of minimum wage effects on the employment of low-wage
workers typically use a reduced-form approach to examine the association
between changes in the minimum wage and employment rates of teenagers or
young adults.  We employ a similar strategy in investigating the relationship
between minimum wage changes and the family-income position of low-wage
workers, using state-level panel data.   Most previous studies of minimum-wage
effects on the income distribution have relied on simulation exercises that
potentially ignore many of the important consequences of minimum wages.
Our analysis does not make any assumptions about these consequences, thereby
allowing an improved and more direct method for estimating the impact of
minimum wages on the distribution of family income.
Our results provide evidence that increases in minimum wages in the
1990s have served to reduce poverty.  This evidence is strongest when we
examine the poverty rates of junior-high dropouts.  There is also evidence that
minimum wages reduce poverty for teenagers, but support for this result is
somewhat more sensitive to specification changes (in particular, to allowing
state effects to follow separate trends over time).   In contrast, our results
suggest that minimum wage increases in the 1980s did not appear to reduce
poverty for the groups we examine.  A supplementary analysis of employment
for our low-wage groups suggests that this difference may be associated with a
complete lack of any disemployment effect from higher wage minima in the
1990s.   Indeed, our results suggest that there may even be an employment-
increasing effect from higher minimum wages during this period (at least for
junior-high dropouts and for teenagers).
Why underlies this apparent change in the impact of the minimum wages
on both employment and poverty?  We are not sure.  Both the 1983-1989
period and the 1990-96 period began with the economy in a downturn, and
ended with sustained growth.  It is therefore difficult to argue that there was
more room for the minimum wage to improve the economic conditions of low-
wage workers in the later period compared to the earlier one.  It is true that the
labor market situation of low-skilled workers deteriorated rapidly during the
1980s, and that this deterioration did not continue during the early 1990s
(though it had not begun any reversion before 1995).  Yet for this change to
account for our pattern of our results, it would have to be the case that the
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relative demand shifts against low-wage workers varied across states in a
manner that was correlated with minimum-wage changes in those states, and it
is again difficult to readily see how this might be the case.
We did examine the possibility that our employment and poverty results
were the result of a differential change in the relative supplies of low-skilled to
high-skilled labor in minimum-wage increasing states compared to states
without minimum increases.  Our approach was to include the ratio of the
population of the low-wage group to the population of prime-age individuals as
an additional regressor in our employment equations.  This variable was
generally not statistically significant, however, and often had an unexpected
positive sign (we expected that a reduced supply of a low-wage group would
increase employment of that group).  It also tended to leave the minimum wage
coefficient estimate unaffected.
We also considered whether or not the general economic conditions in states
that increased minimum wages on their own accord differed greatly from those
in states that chose not to do so, and, in particular, whether these differences
might have themselves been greater for states increasing minima in the 1990s
than in the 1980s.  Conceivably, the labor-market conditions confronting
junior-high dropouts might have been particularly severe (relative to the nation
as a whole) in states that increased minimum wages in the 1990s, as opposed to
the 1980s, implying that there was more potential improvement in those
conditions in the 1990s as the overall economy improved.  To explore these
comparisons, we separated states into those which did and those which did not
raise minimum wages over the 1983-89 period, and computed some average
characteristics at the start of that period (1983) for these two groups of states.
These averages are presented in the first two columns of results in Table 6.  It is
clear that economic conditions were initially better in those states that did
increase wage minima, and that this difference was particularly large in the
poverty rate for junior-high dropouts.  But if a similar type of comparison is
drawn for states increasing minimum wages in the 1989-96 interval (measuring
conditions at the start of that period), much the same pattern is observed -- see
the final two columns of Table 6.  This should not be too surprising, given that
it is largely the same group of states increasing minimums in both periods.23
                                                          
23 As can be seen from Table 1, only New Jersey and Iowa increased their minimum wage in
the 1989-96 period but not in the earlier period.  Only Wisconsin increased its minimum in
the 1983-89 period but not in the later period.  The comparison in Table 6 are still useful,
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We are not sure of an explanation for why minimum wage impacts
appear to have had such different effects in the 1990s than in the 1980s.  It is
intriguing to us that these differences show up in both employment and poverty
analyses, and suggests that it may be useful to apply research strategies from
previous papers that discovered disemployment effects to data from the 1990s
to see if these results continue to hold.  It is also interesting that the paper most
often cited for suggesting a positive employment effect from minimum wages
(Card and Krueger, 1994) studied a minimum-wage change that occurred in the
1990s.  It may be that we are seeing a continuation of a trend pointed out by
Wellington (1991), in which any deleterious effects of minimum wages on the
labor market of low-skilled workers appear to have gradually dissipated over
time.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
however, as the economic conditions in those states relative to the national as a whole
could have changed between the two periods.
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Table 1: State Minimum Wages for States Above the Federal Minimum Wagea
State
Year
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Alaska 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 4.19 4.64 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.88
California 3.80 4.25 4.25 4.25
Connecticut 3.37 3.37 3.37 3.37 3.47 3.88 4.25 4.25 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.40
Delaware 4.59
Dist. Of Col.b 3.82 3.83 3.85 3.99 4.16 4.33 4.33 4.37 4.50 4.50 4.69 5.25 5.25 5.25
Hawaii 3.85 3.85 3.85 4.15 4.65 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25
Iowa 3.85 4.25 4.65 4.65 4.65 4.65 4.68
Mass. 3.45 3.60 3.70 3.75 3.79 4.75
Maine 3.45 3.55 3.65 3.65 3.75 3.85 4.15
Minnesota 3.55 3.85 3.95 4.25
New Hamp. 3.45 3.55 3.65 3.76
New Jersey 4.85 5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05
Ta
ble
s
Table 1 (continued): State Minimum Wages for States Above the Federal Minimum Wagea
State
Year
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Oregon 3.53 4.25 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75
Pennsylvania 3.67 3.78
Rhode Island 3.45 3.60 3.83 4.10 4.25 4.40 4.45 4.45 4.45 4.45 4.55
Vermont 3.40 3.50 3.60 3.70 3.80 4.15 4.50 4.75
Washington 3.85 4.25 4.25 4.90 4.90 4.90
Wisconsin 3.50
Federal
Minimum
3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.69 4.14 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.38
aIf the minimum wage changed in the middle of the year, the minimum wage was calculated as a weighted average of the old and new
minima, with weights equal to the percentage of the year in which the relevant minimum was in effect.  Blank entries imply that the
prevailing minimum in that state and year was the same as the federal minimum.  Data on state minima were obtained from January issues
of the Monthly Labor Review.
bUntil 1993, the District of Columbia (D.C.) maintained different minimum wages for different occupations.  For this period, our minimum
wage measures for D.C. were averages of these various minimum wages.
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations for the State-Level Sample,
1983-96a
Distribution
measure
Group
Prime-age
individuals Teenagers Young adults
Junior-high
dropouts
Poverty rate .09
(.03)
.18
(.07)
.18
(.06)
.26
(.08)
Percent below 1.25 times
the poverty line
.12
(.04)
.23
(.08)
.23
(.07)
.36
(.09)
Percent above 3 times the
poverty line
.57
(.08)
.45
(.10)
.41
(.11)
.21
(.08)
Percent above 5 times the
poverty line
.26
(.08)
.18
(.07)
.16
(.08)
.06
(.04)
Weekly earningsb 511
(69)
95
(27)
254
(46)
138
(52)
Number of individuals in
state/year cell
1142
(953)
171
(153)
213
(199)
271
(290)
aThese are unweighted means (and standard deviations) across the 714 state-year
combinations.  bThe weekly earnings variable was calculated including a zero for workers
with no earnings; it is expressed in 1996 dollars.
Table 3: GLS Fixed-Effects Estimates of Poverty Rate Equationsa
Group/
  Independent variable
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Teenagers
  Log of minimum wage -.09
(.04)
-.07
(.04)
-.09
(.04)
-.07
(.04)
  Level of minimum
wageb
-.15
(.08)
  Prime-age poverty ratec .88
(.10)
.88
(.10)
.82
(.11)
  Prime-age male
  unemployment rate
.63
(.12)
.20
(.13)
  Average aged -.12
(.15)
-.10
(.14)
-.10
(.14)
-.15
(.15)
-.11
(.14)
  Percent white, non-
  hispanic
-.23
(.04)
-.19
(.04)
-.19
(.04)
-.22
(.04)
-.19
(.04)
  Percent hispanic .16
(.06)
.08
(.06)
.08
(.06)
.11
(.06)
.07
(.06)
  Elasticitye -.50 -.39 -.40 -.50 -.39
Young adults
  Log of minimum wage -.05
(.04)
-.04
(.04)
-.06
(.04)
-.04
(.04)
  Level of minimum wage -.08
(.09)
  Prime-age poverty rate .59
(.10)
.59
(.10)
.48
(.11)
  Prime-age male
  unemployment rate
.57
(.13)
.32
(.14)
  Average age -.08
(.11)
-.12
(.11)
-.12
(.11)
-.10
(.11)
-.13
(.11)
  Percent white, non-
  hispanic
-.19
(.04)
-.19
(.04)
-.19
(.04)
-.19
(.04)
-.19
(.04)
Table 3 (continued): GLS Fixed-Effects Estimates of Poverty Rate Equations
Group/
  Independent variable
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  Percent hispanic .10
(.07)
.04
(.06)
.04
(.06)
.05
(.07)
.02
(.06)
  Elasticity -.28 -.22 -.21 -.33 -.22
Junior-high dropouts
  Log of minimum wage -.13
(.04)
-.12
(.04)
-.13
(.04)
-.12
(.04)
  Level of minimum wage -.26
(.09)
  Prime-age poverty rate .33
(.11)
.33
(.11)
.22
(.11)
  Prime-age male
  unemployment rate
.44
(.13)
.34
(.14)
  Average aged -.05
(.01)
-.05
(.01)
-.05
(.01)
-.05
(.01)
-.05
(.01)
  Percent white, non-
  hispanic
-.18
(.05)
-.17
(.05)
-.17
(.05)
-.17
(.05)
-.17
(.05)
  Percent hispanic -.05
(.06)
-.07
(.06)
-.07
(.06)
-.09
(.06)
-.09
(.06)
  Elasticity -.50 -.46 -.48 -.50 -.46
aWeights were constructed from a regression of squared OLS residuals on a constant and a
factor proportional to the sampling error in the dependent variable.  In situations where the
constant in this regression was insignificant at the 5 percent level, it was dropped in
obtaining the GLS estimates.  The sample size for each regression is 714 (51 states
observed in 14 years). The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
b The minimum wage variable is expressed in tens of 1996 dollars (using the CPI-U price
index)
c The prime-age poverty rate is for all individuals aged between 25 and 54 years, except in
specification (5) where it refers to prime-age individuals living alone with an educational
level higher than a high-school degree.
dThis is average age in the targeted group, divided by 10.
eThe elasticity is calculated at the average poverty rate for the specific group.
Table 4: Alternative Estimation Strategies for Poverty Rate Equationsa
Group/
 Independent variable
OLS
Estimates
(Robust
Standard
Errors)
Alternative
Poverty
Rateb
Lagged
Minimum
Effects
Sample
Period:
1983-89
State/Year
Trends
Included
Teenagers
  Log of minimum
  wage
-.11
(.05)
-.03
(.04)
-.03
(.06)
.04
(.07)
-.03
(.05)
  Lagged log of
  minimum wagec
-.03
(.06)
[.15]
  Prime-age poverty
  rate
.75
(.12)
.85
(.09)
.80
(.11)
.86
(.17)
.79
(.12)
Young adults
  Log of minimum
  wage
-.02
(.05)
-.06
(.05)
.02
(.07)
-.01
(.05)
-.05
(.04)
  Lagged log of
  minimum wage
-.03
(.07)
[.87]
  Prime-age poverty
  rate
.48
(.11)
-.06
(.05)
.55
(.12)
.54
(.15)
.53
(.12)
Junior-high dropouts
  Log of minimum
  wage
-.08
(.05)
-.14
(.05)
-.17
(.06)
-.01
(.05)
-.12
(.04)
  Lagged log of
  minimum wage
.05
(.06)
[.01]
  Prime-age poverty
  rate
.32
(.13)
.29
(.11)
.22
(.12)
.28
(.15)
.23
(.13)
aUnless otherwise noted, all estimations use the same specification as in the fifth
specification of Table 3, and use the same GLS correction as noted in that table. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
bThe alternative poverty rate is measured using poverty lines equal to 1.25 times the
official cutoffs.  The alternative poverty rate for prime-age individuals is used as the
prime-age poverty measure in this specification.
cThe number in brackets is the p-value for a test that the sum of the current and lagged
coefficients is equal to zero.
Table 5: GLS Fixed-Effects Estimates of Earnings and Weeks Worked
Equationsa
Group/
  Independent variable
Dependent variableb
Annual
Earnings
Weekly
Earnings
Weeks Worked
Full Sample 1983-89
Only
Teenagers
  Log of minimum wage .65
(.20)
.69
(.20)
.23
(.12)
-.24
(.21)
  Log of prime-age
  earningsc
.68
(.17)
.64
(.14)
.33
(.09)
.38
(.15)
  Log of prime-age weeks .40
(.25)
.02
(.41)
Young Adults
  Log of minimum wage .21
(.10)
.23
(.11)
.03
(.06)
-.01
(.10)
  Log of prime-age
  earnings
.60
(.09)
.47
(.08)
.02
(.05)
.05
(.08)
  Log of prime-age weeks .52
(.13)
.27
(.22)
Junior-High Dropouts
  Log of minimum wage .40
(.22)
.36
(.28)
.38
(.14)
.21
(.16)
  Log of prime-age
  earnings
.22
(.17)
.15
(.17)
.03
(.10)
.43
(.13)
  Log of prime-age weeks .11
(.25)
-.41
(.36)
aAll specifications include (as controls) the male unemployment rate, average age, percent
white-non-hispanic, percent hispanic, and state and year dummies.  The estimation uses
the same GLS procedure as used for the Table 3 estimates.  The average earnings
variables are calculated including zeros for those individuals with no earnings over the
course of the year. Standard errors are in parentheses.
bAll dependent variables are in logs.
cThis is annual earnings in the annual earnings equations, and weekly earnings in the other
equations.
Table 6: Average Characteristics of States with and without State Minimum
Wage Increasesa
Characteristic
1983-89 1989-96
With
Increase
Without
Increase
With
Increase
Without
Increase
Prime-Age Poverty Rate .08 .11 .06 .09
Prime-Age Weekly
Earnings b
$501 $459 $582 $501
Prime-Age Percent White,
Non-Hispanic
.84 .85 .83 .83
Prime-Age Male
Unemployment Rate
.065 .069 .033 .036
Teenager Poverty Rate .19 .21 .13 .17
Young Adult Poverty
Rate
.15 .20 .13 .18
Dropout Poverty Rate .21 .28 .21 .26
aThe characteristics are for the first year of the specified period.  They are simple averages
across states.
bThe weekly earnings variable is in current dollars.
